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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Five years ago, in Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 
765 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014), we held that a debt collector 
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, when it sent a collection letter in an 
envelope displaying the debtor’s internal account number with 
the collection agency.  We are now asked to decide whether the 
same is true when the envelope does not, on its face, show the 
account number but does display an unencrypted “quick 
response,” or “QR,” code that reveals the number when 
scanned.  The District Court held that such conduct violates the 
FDCPA.  We agree and will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The facts underlying this appeal are undisputed.    
Donna DiNaples had a credit card through Chase Bank.    
Eventually, she fell behind on her payments, so Chase assigned 
her account to a debt collection agency called MRS BPO, LLC 
(“MRS”).  MRS sent DiNaples a collection letter as a pressure-
sealed envelope that had a QR code printed on its face.  QR 
codes, including the one here, can be scanned by a reader 
downloadable as an application (better known as an “app”) on 
a smartphone.  And this QR code, when scanned with a QR-
code reader, revealed the following sequence:  
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“LU4.###1813.3683994.”1  The string “LU4.###1813” was 
the internal reference number associated with DiNaples’s 
account at MRS.  
   
DiNaples filed a class action lawsuit against MRS, 
alleging that the collection agency, by printing the QR code on 
the envelope, had violated the FDCPA, which prohibits debt 
collectors from “[u]sing any language or symbol, other than the 
debt collector’s address, on any envelope when 
communicating with a consumer by use of the mails.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692f(8).  Each side eventually filed a motion for 
summary judgment.   
 
The District Court granted DiNaples’s motion on 
liability, concluding that MRS violated the FDCPA.  The 
District Court explained that this conclusion was required by 
our decision in Douglass, in which we held that a debt collector 
violates § 1692f(8) by placing on an envelope the consumer’s 
account number with the debt collector.  765 F.3d at 303, 306.    
For the District Court, there was no meaningful difference 
between displaying the account number itself and displaying a 
QR code — scannable “by any teenager with a smartphone 
app” — with the number embedded.  DiNaples v. MRS BPO, 
LLC, No. 2:15-cv-01435-MAP, 2017 WL 5593471, at *2 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017).  The District Court further rejected 
MRS’s contention that DiNaples had not “suffered a concrete 
injury,” explaining that DiNaples was injured by “the 
disclosure of confidential information.”  Id.  And the District 
Court rejected MRS’s argument that it was protected by the 
                                              
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(a)(4), 
MRS and DiNaples omitted the first three digits of her account 
number from their summary-judgment filings.  
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FDCPA’s “bona fide error defense.”  Id. at *3.  The District 
Court also certified the proposed class. 
 
The parties thereafter stipulated that, to the extent that 
there was liability, the damages would be $11,000.  The 
District Court granted judgment for DiNaples and the class for 
that amount, and this timely appeal followed.   
 
II. 
 
 We consider first a jurisdictional issue –– DiNaples’s 
standing to sue.2  The District Court, while it did determine that 
DiNaples had suffered a concrete injury, never explicitly 
addressed standing, seemingly assuming it was a non-issue.    
We, though, must assure ourselves of DiNaples’s standing.  
Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts to 
adjudication of “Cases” and “Controversies.”  U.S. Const. art. 
III, § 2, cl. 1.  “Courts enforce the case-or-controversy 
requirement” by requiring the plaintiff to have standing to sue.  
Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Standing has three elements: “[t]he plaintiff must 
have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to 
the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely 
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”  Spokeo, Inc. 
v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).  An “injury in fact” is 
one that is “concrete and particularized.”  Id. at 1548 (quoting 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).  To 
                                              
2 As long as DiNaples has standing, the District Court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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be concrete, the injury “must actually exist.”  Id.  It must be 
“real,” not “abstract.”  Id.  
  
The question here is whether DiNaples suffered a 
concrete injury when her debt collector sent her a letter in an 
envelope displaying a QR code that, when scanned, revealed 
her account number with the debt collection agency.  We 
conclude that she did.  
 
Because DiNaples’s injury was intangible, we begin our 
analysis with the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo.  There, 
the Court reaffirmed that, while tangible injuries are typically 
easier to identify, “intangible injuries can nevertheless be 
concrete.”  136 S. Ct. at 1549.  The Court in Spokeo offered 
guidance for determining the concreteness of an intangible 
injury.  The Court explained that “both history and the 
judgment of Congress play important roles.”  Id.  As to history, 
courts should “consider whether an alleged intangible harm has 
a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been 
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or 
American courts.”  Id.  Congress’s “judgment is also 
instructive and important,” because Congress “is well 
positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum 
Article III requirements.”  Id.  Granted, just because a plaintiff 
asserts a congressionally created cause of action does not 
necessarily mean that the plaintiff has suffered a concrete 
injury.  Id.  A “bare procedural violation” will not meet the 
concreteness requirement.  Id.  But “the violation of a 
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some 
circumstances to constitute injury in fact,” and “a plaintiff in 
such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one 
Congress has identified.”  Id.  
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We have already applied the principles set forth in 
Spokeo to a similar situation.  In St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters 
Creditors Bureau, 898 F.3d 351 (3d Cir. 2018), we held that a 
debtor suffered a concrete injury when a debt collector, in 
violation of the FDCPA, sent him a collection letter in an 
envelope displaying his account number with the debt 
collector.  Id. at 355, 358.  We explained that our earlier 
decision in Douglass –– though not a decision directly 
addressing standing –– resolved the matter.  Id. at 357–58.  In 
Douglass, we had held that displaying a consumer’s account 
number on an envelope was not “benign,” explaining that such 
conduct “implicates a core concern animating the FDCPA—
the invasion of privacy.”  765 F.3d at 303.  That number, we 
emphasized in Douglass, was “a core piece of information” 
relating to the debtor’s status as such, and, if “[d]isclosed to the 
public, it could be used to expose her financial predicament.”  
Id.  Thus, in St. Pierre, we concluded that the harm inflicted by 
exposing the debtor’s account number was “a legally 
cognizable injury.”  898 F.3d at 358.  We explained that, 
because the harm involves the invasion of privacy, it “is closely 
related to harm that has traditionally been regarded as 
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English and American 
courts.”  Id. (citing Douglass, 765 F.3d at 303, and Spokeo, 136 
S. Ct. at 1549).  And therefore, per Spokeo, the plaintiff in St. 
Pierre had standing.  
 
 St. Pierre, to be sure, did not involve the precise 
situation we have here –– an account number displayed not on 
the face of the envelope but embedded in a QR code.  And in 
St. Pierre we explicitly declined to address that scenario.  See 
id. at 357 n.6 (“[W]e need not reach the question whether 
exposure of the ‘quick response’ code on the envelope, without 
more, would be sufficient to confer standing under the FDCPA 
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because exposure of one’s account number itself suffices.”).  
We similarly declined to consider our QR-code issue in 
Douglass.  See 765 F.3d at 301 n.4 (“Douglass no longer 
presses her argument that Convergent violated the FDCPA by 
including the QR Code on the envelope. . . . We therefore do 
not decide that issue.”). 
 
 Nonetheless, we conclude that the reasoning of those 
two cases inevitably dictates that DiNaples has suffered a 
concrete injury.  Disclosure of the debtor’s account number 
through a QR code, which anyone could easily scan and read, 
still “implicates core privacy concerns.”  Id. at 304.  The debt 
collector has “displayed core information relating to the debt 
collection” that is “susceptible to privacy intrusions.”  Id. at 
305.  Whether disclosed directly on the envelope or less 
directly through a QR code, the protected information has been 
made accessible to the public.  And as we concluded in St. 
Pierre, such an invasion of privacy “is closely related to harm 
that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a 
lawsuit in English and American courts.”  898 F.3d at 357–58.  
It thus follows from our Douglass and St. Pierre decisions that 
DiNaples has suffered a sufficiently concrete harm. 
 
 MRS is incorrect to suggest that “to establish Article III 
standing, [DiNaples] would have to show that someone 
actually intercepted her mail, scanned the barcode, read the 
unlabeled string of numbers and determined the contents 
related to debt collection –– or it was imminent someone might 
do so.”  MRS Br. 16 (emphases omitted).  The teaching of 
Douglass and St. Pierre is that the disclosure of an account 
number is itself the harm –– it “implicates core privacy 
concerns,” Douglass, 765 F.3d at 304, and therefore is 
sufficiently concrete under Spokeo to establish an injury-in-
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fact, St. Pierre, 898 F.3d at 357–58.  In other words, because 
the disclosure is the concrete harm here, DiNaples “need not 
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has 
identified.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.  Her evidence that she 
received an envelope with a QR code containing private 
information was enough to establish a concrete injury.3 
 
 We hold that DiNaples has standing to sue. 
 
III. 
 
 Satisfied that DiNaples has standing, we now consider 
whether the District Court correctly determined that she had a 
successful claim under the FDCPA.  Our review is de novo.  
See Tundo v. Cty. of Passaic, 923 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 
A. 
 
The FDCPA, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8), 
prohibits debt collectors from: 
 
[u]sing any language or symbol, other than the 
debt collector’s address, on any envelope when 
communicating with a consumer by use of the 
mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector 
                                              
3 For this reason, MRS’s attempt to distinguish St. 
Pierre as involving a motion to dismiss, and hence a lower 
evidentiary standard, falls flat.  Though the motion here is for 
summary judgment, DiNaples has offered sufficient evidence 
of her concrete injury, namely the envelope’s displaying a QR 
code embedded with her account number. 
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may use his business name if such name does not 
indicate that he is in the debt collection business. 
 
There is no dispute that that provision plainly prohibits the QR 
code.  Still, as other courts have observed, § 1692f(8) is rather 
expansive when read literally.  It would seemingly prohibit 
including “a debtor’s address and an envelope’s pre-printed 
postage,” as well as “any innocuous mark related to the post, 
such as ‘overnight mail’ and ‘forwarding and address 
correction requested.’”  Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., 
Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Goswami v. 
Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 493 (5th Cir. 2004).  
To avoid these “bizarre results,” Strand, 380 F.3d at 318, many 
courts, as well as the Federal Trade Commission, have read a 
“benign language exception” into § 1692f(8), see Goswami, 
377 F.3d at 493–94.  Although we have never adopted such an 
exception, MRS asks us to do so here and conclude that the QR 
code falls within it. 
 
 But once again, we return to our decision in Douglass.  
To repeat, Douglass involved an envelope displaying the 
debtor’s account number with the debt collector.  765 F.3d at 
300–01.  There, as here, the debt collector urged us to read a 
benign language exception into § 1692f(8), and like MRS, the 
debt collector in Douglass argued that the account number 
should fall within that exception.  See id. at 301.  We declined 
to decide whether § 1692f(8) contains such an exception 
because, regardless, the account number was not benign.  Id. at 
301, 303.  That number, we explained, was “a core piece of 
information,” the disclosure of which “implicate[d] a core 
concern animating the FDCPA––the invasion of privacy.”  Id. 
at 303.  We thus rejected the debt collector’s contention that 
the “account number is a meaningless string of numbers and 
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letters, and its disclosure has not harmed and could not possibly 
harm Douglass.”  Id. at 305–06. 
 
As with standing, the question is whether the analysis 
changes when the account number is not on the face of the 
envelope but is embedded in a QR code.  The panel in Douglass 
explicitly left that question open.  See id. at 301 n.4.  But, 
keeping in mind that “the FDCPA must be broadly construed 
in order to give full effect to [its remedial] purposes,” Caprio 
v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 
(3d Cir. 2013), we agree with the District Court that the 
reasoning of Douglass applies fully to an account number 
embedded in a QR code.  As explained above with respect to 
standing, the harm here is still the same –– the unauthorized 
disclosure of confidential information.  And if such disclosure 
was not benign, disclosure via an easily readable QR code is 
not either.  Protected information has still been compromised. 
 
MRS argues that Douglass is distinguishable.  There, 
the account information was on the face of the envelope, 
capable of being seen by all.  Here, by contrast, the envelope 
facially displayed no connection to debt collection.  It just 
revealed a QR code, which is facially neutral and appears on 
many commercial mailings.  Any account information, 
according to MRS, is hidden from public sight and could only 
be seen by “unlawfully scanning” the envelope.  MRS Br. 24 
n.3.  MRS suggests that “scanning the QR Code on an envelope 
addressed to another is akin to opening a letter addressed to 
another.”  MRS Br. 23. 
 
We are not persuaded.  While we do not decide here 
whether a benign language exception to § 1692f(8) exists, it 
would apply only to language truly benign relative to the 
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purposes of the FDCPA.  See Douglass, 765 F.3d at 303 (“[W]e 
cannot find language exempt from § 1692f(8) if its disclosure 
on an envelope would run counter to the very reasons Congress 
enacted the FDCPA.”).  If, as we held in Douglass, disclosure 
of a debtor’s account number is an invasion of privacy, it 
follows that disclosure of a QR code embedded with that 
number is not benign.  A QR code is still “susceptible to 
privacy intrusions,” even if it does not facially display any 
“core information relating to the debt collection.”4  Id. at 305.  
There is no material difference between disclosing an account 
number directly on the envelope and doing so via QR code –– 
the harm is the same, especially given the ubiquity of 
smartphones.5  Whether it is illegal to scan someone’s mail, as 
MRS argues, is beside the point.  The debt collector has still 
exposed private information to the world in violation of the 
FDCPA.6   
 
                                              
4 We do not consider whether a debt collector violates § 
1692f(8) by including on an envelope a QR code that does not 
contain a consumer’s account number. 
 
5 For this reason, it also does not matter where on the 
envelope the QR code is printed, which MRS suggests makes 
a difference.  The account number has still been disclosed, 
regardless of its location on the envelope.  
 
6 And contrary to MRS’s contentions, there is a 
difference between scanning a letter and opening it.  The 
former can be done surreptitiously without leaving any 
evidence of tampering.  Not so when a letter is physically 
opened.  
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We therefore hold that a debt collector violates § 
1692f(8) when it sends to a debtor an envelope displaying an 
unencrypted QR code that, when scanned, reveals the debtor’s 
account number.  We thus agree with the District Court that 
MRS, in doing so here, violated the FDCPA. 
 
B. 
 
 MRS argues that, even if its conduct violated the 
FDCPA, it is subject to the bona fide error defense.  We 
disagree. 
 
The FDCPA’s bona fide error defense is found in 15 
U.S.C. § 1692k(c), which provides:  
 
[a] debt collector may not be held liable in any 
action brought under this subchapter if the debt 
collector shows by a preponderance of evidence 
that the violation was not intentional and resulted 
from a bona fide error notwithstanding the 
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted 
to avoid any such error. 
 
In Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 
559 U.S. 573 (2010), the Supreme Court held “that the bona 
fide error defense in § 1692k(c) does not apply to a violation 
of the FDCPA resulting from a debt collector’s incorrect 
interpretation of the requirements of that statute.”  Id. at 604–
05.  Put differently, “FDCPA violations forgivable under § 
1692k(c) must result from ‘clerical or factual mistakes,’ not 
mistakes of law.”  Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 
394 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Jerman, 559 U.S. at 587).  
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MRS contends that it committed a mistake of fact.  It 
argues that it “erred by using industry standards for processing 
return mail and appreciating that no person has ever used a QR 
Code to determine a letter concerned debt collection.”  MRS 
Br. 26.  MRS insists that it “did not mistakenly interpret the 
FDCPA.”  MRS Br. 26.  But that is precisely what it did.  While 
MRS tries to characterize its error as one of fact, MRS 
ultimately just misunderstood its obligations under the 
FDCPA.  Indeed, MRS all but admits that point when it argues 
that it “mistakenly believed that its conduct could not 
conceivably violate the FDCPA.”  MRS Br. 31.  That is not a 
mistake of fact; it is a mistake of law.  Had MRS’s printing of 
the QR code been the result of a clerical mistake, accidentally 
included contrary to the agency’s normal procedures, then it 
could conceivably avail itself of the bona fide error defense.  
See Jerman, 559 U.S. at 587.  But that is not MRS’s argument; 
indeed, MRS explains that using QR codes is “the industry 
standard.”  MRS Br. 34.  MRS may not have intended “to 
disclose that the contents of the envelope pertain to debt 
collection,” MRS Br. 27, but the bona fide error defense does 
not protect every well-intentioned act, see Jerman, 559 U.S. at 
584–85.  It applies only to clerical or factual mistakes.  See 
Daubert, 861 F.3d at 394.  The bona fide error defense is 
therefore inapplicable here. 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.  
